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ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT

In light of the decisions in Shapiro and Keenan and the questions raised
therein, the states should re-examine all of their residence requirements,
especially those for professional licenses, to insure that they protect not
only legitimate state interests but also the rights of new residents.
ANTHONY

B.

LAMB

Constitutional Law-Prejudgment Attachment and GarnishmentThe Progeny of the Sniadach-Kelly Marriage
In the summer of 1969, the Supreme Court held in Sniadachv. Family
Finance Corp.1 that a prejudgment garnishment of wages under the facts
involved in the case constituted a taking of property without due process
of law unless the wage earner was afforded a hearing prior to the garnishment. The Wisconsin garnishment procedure involved in Sniadach entitled one with a claim against a wage earner to a court order freezing
one half of the worker's wages until the merits of the claim could be
litigated.2 Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated that
"[s]uch summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due
process in extraordinary situations ....

But in the present case no situa-

tion requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest is presented
by the facts ....-" The opinion noted that "[w] e deal here with wages
-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our
economic system," 4 stressed the serious harm that wage garnishment could
cause, and concluded that the Wisconsin garnishment procedure and others
like it "may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the
wall."
U.S. 337 (1969).
The statutes involved in Sniadach were Ch.507, [1965] Wis. Sess. L. - which
were codified as Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1969). These statutes have
been amended and are presently codified as Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (Supp.
1970).
' Id. at 339. As examples of "extraordinary circumstances" which would justify
summary procedures, Justice Douglas cited Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594 (1950) (federal statute authorizing seizure of misbranded articles
without a prior hearing); Fahey v. Mallonee, 3,32 U.S. 245 (1947) (appointment
of a conservator to take possession of a federal savings and loan association prior
to a hearing); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (state statute authorizing prejudgment liens on the property of stockholders of insolvent banks);
Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (state statute conditioning the opportunity
to appear and defend in foreign attachment proceedings upon the posting of a
bond).
at 340.
'Id.
Id.at 341-42.
1395
-
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The vagueness of the Sniadach opinion and the summary fashion in
which Justice Douglas disposed of the problem have resulted in confusion and disagreement among courts and legal commentators. Some have
argued that because of the opinion's pointed emphasis on the damaging
effects of wage garnishment and its repeated references to the possibilities
of abuse of summary garnishment procedures, the decision was in reality
based on substantive due process grounds. 6 Others have contended that
since only the wages of the poor are subjected to garnishment, the opinion
must have been based in part upon the equal protection clause.7 There
is also disagreement as to the scope of Sniadach, some asserting that

Justice Douglas limited application of the decision exclusively to wage
garnishment8 and others arguing that the characterization of wages as a
"specialized type of property" was not intended to limit the scope of the
decision,9

Much of the confusion and disagreement attributable to the Sniadach
opinion can be resolved by superimposing on Justice Douglas' rather

cryptic language traditional constitutional principles developed to deal with
procedural due process problems. The Court restated and summarized
these principals in Goldberg v. Kelly,10 decided after Sniadach. Considering the question of whether due process required a hearing prior to the
termination of welfare benefits, Mr. Justice Brennan said:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned
to suffer grievous loss" . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's

interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in
summary adjudication."'
Thus, resolution of due process problems ordinarily requires a weighing of
the harm caused to the individual by the challenged procedure against the
"interest of society served by quick and decisive action."'"
8

E.g., id. at 345 (Black, J., dissenting).
'E.g., Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 CoLUm.

L. Rav. 942, 954

(1970).

'E.g., Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court; 105 Ariz. 270, -, 463 P.2d 68, 70

(1969).

'E.g., Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 718, 172 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1969).
U.S. 254 (1970).
11
Id. at 262-63, quoting Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
10397

123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For examples of other cases employing similar language see Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961) ; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959) ; Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1967).(5th Cir. 1970).
" Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 440
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In Sniadach, Justice Douglas followed this traditional approach although he failed to articulate adequately the balancing test and to consider
fully each of the test's components. The opinion vividly demonstrated
that summary garnishment procedures might cause the wage earner to
be deprived of the essentials of life on the basis of an invalid claim, resulting perhaps in capitulation to the claim in order to survive. And this
harm directly results from the peculiar attributes of wages-the fact that
wages are generally used for present consumption. The opinion, however, failed to weigh against this harm to the wage earner any interests
which the state might have in summary wage garnishment.'" This failure
is perhaps due to Justice Douglas' tacit assumption that the harm was so
great that it could be outweighed only in the extraordinary situations
which he mentioned.'" At any rate, Sniadach represents neither a break
with long-established constitutional principles nor a rejection of the procedural due process balancing test. Instead, it adopts and applies that test,
although it does so inartfully.
Klim v. Jones, 5 a recent example of the application of Sniadach in
a non-wage context, demonstrates more fully the operation of the balancing
test. The statutory procedure involved in the case granted to innkeepers
liens upon the personal property of tenants who failed to pay their rent and
authorized self-help tactics in seizing the property subject to the lien.'5
Pursuant to this law Jones seized Klim's belongings, including clothes,
tools, and identification papers. Klim filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the law was unconstitutional, an injunction against enforcement
of the law, a return of the seized property, and certain damages. In
" One writer has suggested that the public interests in summary garnishment
statutes are (1) ensuring that valid claims will be collectible and (2) promoting

the extension of credit. He contends, however, that this second interest must be
discounted by the risk of encouraging, through facile collection devices, unwise
credit extension. Note, Attachment and Garnishment-ConstitutionatLaw-Due
Process of Law--Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of Due
Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of the Law,
68 MicH. L. REv. 986, 996-97 (1970). Unless otherwise stated, this note will

proceed on the theory that such are the public interests in all attachment and

garnishment statutes.
x, Id. at 997-98. See note 3 supra.
10315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
GAL. Civ. CoDE § 1861 (West Supp. 1971). Arguably this statute and many
C0
prehearing attachment statutes authorize constitutionally impermissible searches and
seizures. Compare Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), with
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). In
Fuentes motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted and probable jurisdiction noted. 91 S. Ct. 893 (1971). The search and seizure issue, however, is beyond the scope of this note and will receive no 'further consideration.
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granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the constitutional
issue, the court concluded that the lien statute imposed even greater
economic hardships than prejudgment wage garnishment. And the court
found no public interest in the summary procedure sufficient to outweigh
those hardships. The interest offered to justify the law-the use of the
lien to obtain in personam jurisdiction over transient tenants-was discounted by the court because the threat of the lien provided no "iron-clad
safeguard for the California proprietor"17 against absconding tenants
and because "the danger of a non-paying transient leaving the state just
to avoid a lodging bill does not seem to be at all common"18 since many
of the establishments employing the lien device catered to lodgers who
stayed for significant periods of time. Furthermore, the court noted that
it was not abolishing the innkeeper's lien altogether but was only requiring certain procedural safeguards in its use, and that the innkeeper
had an alternative protective device available-advance payment.
The due process balancing test worked exceptionally well in Klim
and resulted in a holding which seems unquestionably correct. Two other
recent cases, however, provide examples of situations where the balancing
test operates much less smoothly. In Fuentes v. Faircloth0 and Laprease
v.Raymours FurnitureCo.,"0 the statutes under consideration entitled a
plaintiff in a replevin action to a writ of replevin and seizure of the
subject matter of the suit without any prior notice to the defendant and
without a hearing before the seizure."' In Fuentes a stove and a stereo set
had been seized and in Laprease the seized property included a stove, a
refrigerator, a bed, a rug, and a record player. In both cases the merchandise had been purchased under conditional sales contracts.
The three-judge court in Fuentes held that the replevin procedure
comported with the requirements of due process. The court seemed to
base its holding on two alternative grounds: first, that the balancing test
of Sniadach and Kelly did not apply since the wage garnishment and
welfare situations "[are] not at all comparable to a private contract
providing for enforcement of a security interest" ;22 and second, that even
if the balancing test did apply "[t] he hardships facing the welfare recipient,
17315 F. Supp. at 124.

IsId.

I8317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
"315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
2The statutes involved in Fuentes were FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01, .04, .07, .08
(Supp. 1971). The statute involved in Laprease was N.Y. Civ. P Ac. LAW
§§7101-02 (McKinney 1963).
2317 F. Supp. at 958.
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like those facing one whose wages are garnished, are not present in the
instant situation where goods purchased are replevied."'
The three-judge court in Laprease reached exactly the opposite result.
The opinion stated that the factual difference between Sniadach and the
case under consideration-that one dealt with an unsecured interest while
the other involved a secured interest-"dissolves before the purchasers'
claims that there were no defaults and no right to repossession." '
Applying the balancing test, the court concluded that "[1] ack of refrigeration, cooking facilities and beds create hardships . . . equally as severe

as the temporary withholding of [one-half] of Sniadach' s pay,""2 and that
no counterbalancing public interest in the summary procedure existed. 6
Neither Fuentes nor Laprease appears to be precisely correct. The
suggestion in Fuentes that the presence of a security interest will remove
a case from the operation of the Sniadach-Kelly balancing approach is
without justification. As the dissenting judge in the case noted, "when
one signs a contract which includes the words 'in the event of default of
any payment or payments, seller at its option may take back the merchandise,' he does not waive his Fourteenth Amendment right to 'due
process of law.' "27 The Fuentes court likewise erred when it concluded
that seizure of the stove presented no hardships comparable to those
suffered by the plaintiffs in Sniadach and Kelly. The loss of an appliance
as necessary as a stove for the preparation of food can produce harm quite
as serious as the loss of one-half of one's wages or the loss of welfare
benefits. At any rate, since the loss of the stove obviously produced some
harm, the question with which the court should have concerned itself was
whether that harm was outweighed by the public interest in the summary
procedure.
The Laprease court avoided the errors discussed above but became so
immersed in the question of whether the replevin of essential items like
stoves, beds, etc., violated due process that it overlooked the fact that the
propriety of the summary seizure of such non-essential items as a rug
and a phonograph was at issue as well. Loss of a phonograph or a rug
causes harm much less severe than that caused by the loss of a stove or
refrigerator, and, had the court applied the due process balancing test
to the seizure of the non-essential items, it might have concluded that the
3 1d.
2"315 F. Supp. at 723.
2r Id. at 723-24.
.'Id. at 723.
S317 F. Supp. at 959 (Eaton, J., dissenting).
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summary procedure as applied to those items was constitutionally permissible.
The Fueutes and Laprease opinions, with all their imperfections,
and the Klim decision demonstrate many of the problems with the
Sniadach-Kelly balancing approach."' One of the most serious of these
problems is that where the public interest in a summary procedure and the
harm precipitated by the procedure appear to be nearly evenly balanced,
as where non-essential items are replevied without a prior hearing, any
conclusion as to which interest preponderates is no more than a highly
subjective value judgment. Not only is this intellectually unsatisfying; it
also militates against any certainty in the law on procedural due process
questions.
Most of the other problems with the due process balancing test stem
from the fact that the test must be applied on a case-to-case basis. The
type of property involved as well as the individual circumstances of the
person whose property is summarily interfered with must be considered
before any balancing can take place. This means that any procedure
authorizing interference with one's property without the normal due
process safeguards will be open to attack in every case where the procedure
is employed, and that no amount of case law can limit these attacks since
the property owner in every instance can argue that his is a special case.
It also means that state legislators will find it most difficult, if not impossible, to draft statutes authorizing summary attachment or garnishment
29
procedures which will pass muster under the balancing approach.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, there is no reason to believe that
the Supreme Court will discard or modify the due process balancing test.
It is too well grounded in precedent and too well suited to the recognition
of the competing interests involved in due process questions to be tossed
aside. Prognostication in this area is wholly speculative but it is not
altogether unreasonable in this day of consumer protection to wonder if
2

One initial problem with the balancing approach is that it does not answer the

question of what type of hearing, if any, must be granted prior to the seizure. Con-

siderable controversy over this question existed after Sniadach. See, e.g., Note,
Poverty Law.-Garnishment-Protectionof Debtors' Rights, 48 N.C.L. Rav. 164,

170-71 (1969). Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), seems to have resolved

this controversy by requiring that the hearing determine only the probable validity
of the claim. Id. at 266-67.
9This problem will become especially acute if-as suggested in Sidadach, 395
U.S. at 339, and in Laprease, 315 F. Supp. at 723-any statute not narrowly drawn
to meet situations where the public interest outweighs the individual harm will be
held impermissible.
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DUTY TO INTEGRATE ADMINISTRATORS

legislatures, perhaps with a shove from the courts, might not abolish prehearing attachment and garnishment procedures altogether or at least
limit their use to the "extraordinary situations" referred to in Sniadch.8"
FrED H. MooDY, JR.

Constitutional Law-Racial Imbalance in Public Schools:
The Affirmative Duty to Integrate Administrators
On May 28, 1968, the Board of Education of Newark, New Jersey
voted to invalidate a promotional list which was formerly the sole criterion
in the appointment of grade-school administrators.1 The action by the
Board of Education admittedly was motivated by a desire to promote
racial balance in the school system.2 The Negro student population in
Newark was 72.5 %, yet there were only two Negroes on the promotional
list.S Moreover, of 249 administrators in the city school system, only
twenty-seven were Negro.4 In lieu of appointments from the list, the
Board of Education appointed seven new grade-school administratorssix Negro and one white.' As a result, ten white teachers' brought a

suit seeking money damages and injunctive relief under the fourteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7 The principal issue raised
" See note 3 supra.
The contract entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant on February 1, 1967 reads in part:
The positions of principal, vice principal, head teacher, department chairman and counsellor shall be filled in order of numerical ranking from the
appropriate list, which ranking shall be determined by written and oral examination. Appointments to the position of teacher to assist the principal
(formerly called Administrative Assistant) shall be made annually on a
temporary basis if the Superintendent determines that such a position is
necessary or desirable, and all appointments to such positions shall be made
in order of numerical ranking from the appropriate vice principal's list if
such list exists.
Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1256 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W.
3486 (U.S. May 4, 1971) (No. 850).
- Record at 89, 95, 98, Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969).
Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1970).
&Id.
Id. at 1256 n.3. Since the purpose in deviating from the list was to promote
racial balance, it is curious that the Board of Education chose to make a white
appointment. No particular reason can be discovered.
'Four of the plaintiffs-Hickey, Dunne, LaRusso, and Chagnon-had taken
only the first of two stages of the examination to qualify for the list when the list
was suspended. 302 F. Supp. at 728 n.1.
742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The provision reads:

